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Budget Reform and Impoundment
Control*
L. HaroldLevinson**
Jon L. Mills* **
I.

Introduction

Impoundment has become a household word within the past
two years, as controversy has raged over President Nixon's cutbacks
of funds. Numerous significant governmental programs have been
curtailed or disrupted. State and local governments face confusion
about future funding.
In dozens of cases, the lower federal courts have reviewed the
exercise of Presidential discretion during the execution of appropriations, and in most cases the courts have determined that the President acted improperly. The underlying problem evidenced by impoundment remains unsolved, however, since it arises from tensions
that build up throughout the budget process of the federal government, from the preparation of the President's budget recommendations, to the enactment of budget legislation, the execution of the
fed.] See Appendix for subsequent Congressional action concerning pending budget reform
legislation cited note 53 infra.
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budget and the post-audit of completed transactions. The courts
have prudently refrained from examining any stage of the process
other than the execution stage, and the courts have consequently
been unable to fashion a comprehensive remedy.
Thorough overhaul of the entire system is long overdue. The
existing system dates back to 1921, but the size and complexity of
the federal budget have increased to a staggering extent since then.
Studies and proposals abound concerning not only the budget process but also such related matters as congressional committee structure, openness of governmental activities, and reorganization of the
executive branch. The acute need for reform of the entire system
was dramatized and publicized by the impoundment controversy of
1972-73.
Bills pending in both Houses of Congress provide for impoundment control and budget reform. The bills in both houses emphasize
the spending process (including the formulation, enactment and
execution of appropriation) and its coordination with the totals of
revenue and debt. The bills do not go into detail regarding reform
of the revenue and debt functions, although significant procedural
issues arise in these areas also. The emphasis on the spending process reflects the emphasis that the impoundment controversy has
focused on spending rather than on other budgetary functions.
This article summarizes various aspects of the impoundment
controversy, as an introduction to the authors' recommendations for
impoundment control and general reform of the budget process. The
emphasis here, as in the congressional bills, is on reform of the
spending function, and its coordination with total revenue and debt.
A.

Definition and Classificationsof Impoundment

Even though impoundment has been an executive practice
since 1803,1 the term is not defined by statute. The recently enacted
Federal Impoundment and Information Act, which requires the
President to make periodic reports to Congress regarding impound2
ments, does not define the term.
Once the government has received goods or services pursuant
to proper authorization, of course the President is without discretion
1. In 1803 Thomas Jefferson refused to spend funds appropriated for gunboats on the
Mississippi River, deeming such gunboats unnecessary to protect the river's east bank since
the west bank recently had been purchased from France. See Levinson & Mills,
Impoundment: A Search for Legal Principles, 26 FLA. L. REv. 191 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Impoundment: Legal Principles].
2. 31 U.S.C. § 581(c)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
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to default in payment.3 This well settled proposition is not at issue
in the current controversy, and the working definition of "impoundment" should not include any action that would amount to a default
in payment for goods or services received.
The term "impoundment" is more properly applied to situations in which the executive declines to enter into obligations or
commitments for the full amount appropriated by Congress.4 Impoundments can be classified on the basis of various distinctions,
relating to such factors as: the extent to which Congress directed the
expenditure (mandatory or permissive); the stage of the budget process at which the cutoff was achieved (commitment, apportionment, allotment, etc.); the justification given by the executive for
the cutoff (delay needed to complete environmental impact study,
program would contribute to inflation, etc.); or the subject-matter
of the affected program (loans for farmers, housing for low-income
purchasers, etc.).
We propose a distinction, with procedural implications, on the
basis of whether or not the executive has frustrated the intent of the
appropriation act that was affected by an impoundment. We use the
term "variance" to denote the type of impoundment that occurs
when the President achieves program objectives at less cost or a
later date than contemplated by the appropriation act, but without
frustrating its intent.5 Under existing practice, "variance"-type actions are generally carried out as policy-neutral decisions of professional staff personnel,6 contrasted with other types of impoundment
that typically are policy-oriented moves coordinated by higher level
directives.' Our recommendations 8 propose a further procedural distinction, by subjecting variances to a different type of congressional
3. The leading case requiring the government to pay its obligations is Kendall ex rel.
Stokes v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). Cases decided in connection with the
principle, however, have been sometimes cited as precedents indicating solutions to the
current controversy.
4. This seems to be the general understanding of the term "impoundment," repeatedly
implied in the materials compiled in Joint Hearings on S. 373 Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm.
on Impoundment of Funds of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations and the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Impoundment Hearings]. Our proposed definition is set
forth in Recommendation 9, infra.
5. See Recommendation 9 infra.
6. These actions are generally authorized by the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 665
(1970). The distinction between policy-neutral and policy-oriented impoundment decisions
is discussed in text accompanying notes 9-16 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 9-16 infra.
8. Recommendations 10 and 11 infra.
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control than we propose for other types of impoundment.
B.

Impoundment Procedures and Rationalia

Decisions to impound are made by the executive branch alone,
through the use of closed meetings and confidential information.
Field research9 indicates that at least four major types of procedure
have been followed during the Nixon Administrations, corresponding to the various purposes underlying impoundment decisions.
According to one theory, impoundment has resulted from decisions by the President and certain senior advisors regarding the
total amount of impoundment needed to keep governmental spending within limits that the President regards as acceptable, in view
of existing levels of taxation and debt. The total desired amount of
impoundment is transformed into a series of decisions affecting specific programs, made at lower levels of the administration, subject
to continuing review and supervision by higher officials. In order to
keep total spending within the desired limits, officials cut those
programs that have the lowest priority from the executive's point of
view. Thus executive priorities rather than congressionalpriorities
are reflected in the selection of specific programs to be impounded.' 0
A second theory asserts that the Nixon impoundments result
from the President's determination to curtail or eliminate certain
programs, for ideological rather than fiscal reasons. To the extent
this theory is accepted, it implies that the basic, top level decision
is not a spending ceiling in the abstract, but rather a list of specific
programs to be cut.1" Evidently less discretion is exercised by lower
level officials filling in the details under this theory than under the
first.
A third possibility is that President Nixon has used impoundment as a means of demonstrating the fiscal irresponsibility of Congress, in the hope of pressuring Congress into reform of its own
budget process. 12 This theory implies that the President has consid9. The accompanying text is based upon confidential interviews conducted by the authors during the McIntosh Foundation Executive Impoundment Project, 1973.
10. The President and other administration spokesmen have stressed fiscal policy as a
justification for the major impoundments. See notes 27 & 32 infra. This justification is drawn
into question by the econometric study discussed in text accompanying notes 19-20 infra.
11. The President's ideological motives are suggested by Fisher, Congress, the Executive and the Budget, 411 ANNALS 102, 108 (1974); Fisher, Impoundment of Funds: Uses and
Abuses, 23 BUFFALO L. REv. 141, 169 (1973).
12. In his budget message dated January 29, 1973, President Nixon urged Congress to
reform its budget procedures. The President listed a few specific reform suggestions, and
added the following warning:
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ered, as an element of impoundment decision-making, the extent to
which a specific impoundment could effectively embarrass Congress
and jolt it toward self-reform.
Finally, many impoundments are initiated at operational levels
of the administration, on the basis of cost savings or programoriented delays,' 3 under circumstances corresponding to our proposed definition of "variance."' 4
Related to impoundment is "unimpounding," a process described by some executive officials as "fine tuning," by which por5
tions of impounded funds are released. The decision to unimpound
may be made when the complaints arising from an impoundment
are more serious than had been anticipated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the analysis of political costs and
benefits prepared when the impoundment was under consideration.'"
The Congress must accept responsibility for the budget totals and must develop a systematic procedure for maintaining fiscal discipline. To do otherwise in the light of the
budget outlook is to accept the responsibility for increased taxes, higher interest rates,
higher inflation, or all three. In practice, this means that should the Congress pass any
legislation increasing outlays beyond the recommended total, it must find financing for
the additional amount. Otherwise, such legislation will inevitably contribute to undue
inflationary pressures and thus will not be in the public interest. And it will be subject
to veto.
Budget Message of the President, in THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL
YEAR 1974, at 1, 9 (1973) (emphasis in original). At a news conference just 2 days later, Mr.
Nixon indicated that he would not only veto, but also impound if Congress enacted appropriations he regarded as inflationary. He said: "The constitutional right for the President of the
United States to impound funds and that is not to spend money, when the spending of money
would mean either increasing prices or increasing taxes for all the people, that right is
absolutely clear. . . .I will not spend money if Congress overspends. . . " 9 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PMFSNTIAL DOCUMENTS 105, 110 (1973). Similarly, in a statement delivered on

October 23, 1972, Mr. Nixon stated:

Iam going to use every weapon at my command to hold spending in this fiscal year as
close as possible to $250 billion. . . .During the coming week there will be a number
of vetoes. If there are big spending bills which I must sign for policy reasons, I also
promise to exercise my full legal powers to hold down these appropriations, or reduce
others to make room for the new programs.
8 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIUENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1553 (1972).
Confidential interviews conducted by the authors during the McIntosh Executive Impoundment Project in 1973 indicate that only a very small minority of persons interviewed
considered that Mr. Nixon's impoundments had been undertaken primarily for the purpose
of forcing Congress to reform its own budget procedures.
13. These actions are generally authorized by the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 665
(1970).
14. See Recommendation 9 infra.
15. See generally McIntosh Foundation Executive Project: PreliminaryFindings, 119
Cong. Rec. S 21120, S 21122-3 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1973) (hereinafter cited as Preliminary
Findings).
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C. PoliticalPerspectives
Many other Presidents have impounded funds. President
Nixon's impoundments, however, have produced much more controversy than those of his predecessors, a phenomenon which can be
traced to a number of factors.
First, Mr. Nixon has impounded unprecedented amounts from
social programs, whereas his predecessors generally limited their
impoundments to military and public works programs.
Secondly, whether the decision to impound originates because
the President dislikes a certain program or because he sets an abstract ceiling for spending, the fact remains that the programs selected for impoundment are those with the lowest priority from the
President's point of view. Congressional priorities are significantly
different, especially since the congressional majority is politically
opposed to the President's party.
Thirdly, Mr. Nixon has shown himself unwilling or unable to
maintain the informal liaison with congressional leaders that characterized many previous administrations, and notably that of President Lyndon Johnson. The friction between President and Congress
connected with the current proceedings for impeachment make it
increasingly unlikely that Mr. Nixon can develop the kind of relationship that enabled many of his predecessors to work out budget7
ary problems amicably and informally.'
Some observers have suggested that an irreversible shift of
power is taking place from Congress to the executive branch, due
to the inability of the legislature to cope with the complexities and
emergencies of our times.'8 President Nixon's impoundments can,
under this view, be regarded as symptoms of a broader trend. The
courts, however, have imposed significant restraints upon impoundment, and Congress is making strenuous efforts to demonstrate its
ability to cope with budgetary matters-notably by giving serious
consideration to the budget reform bills that recently passed both
Houses.
D.

Economics

The President has repeatedly asserted that his impoundments
16.
17.
18.

See, PreliminaryFindings, supra note 15, at S 21122.
Id. at S 21123-4.
See S. Huntington, CongressionalResponses to the Twentieth Century, in D.
TRUMAN, THE CONGRESS AND AMERICA'S FUTURE 6 (2d ed. 1973).
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have been necessary in order to prevent inflation. Comparisons of
the consumer price index with impoundment against the same
index without impoundment, however, do not bear him out in this
contention. Using the Chase Econometrics Model," Professor Irving
Goffman of the University of Florida 2Ocomputed the price index at
three different levels of federal spending. The first level was the
actual level of federal government spending as of June 5, 1973, the
date of the analysis. A second level was based on a hypothetical
increase in spending of 8.5 billion dollars, the amount of impoundments reported by OMB in February 1973. The third level assumed
that federal spending had increased not by 8.5 but by 14.5 billion
dollars, the impoundment total computed by the Library of Congress staff for the same period.
Neither of these figures accurately portrays the amount of impounding that was carried out for counter-inflationary purposes.
The figures are too high, to the extent they include routine, "variance"-type impoundments, undertaken for program-related reasons
rather than for fiscal reasons. The figures are too low, to the extent
they exclude cutbacks of funds achieved in various manners other
than the creation of "reserves," which are the only item included
in the OMB reports. Despite their inaccuracy, the figures of 8.5
billion and 14.5 billion dollars were used in order to test the counterinflationary effects of impoundments of that general order of magnitude.
The model indicates that impoundment, whether at the 8.5 or
the 14.5 billion-dollar level, caused very little change in the consumer price index. The index in 1974 would, all other things remaining unchanged, be 137.8 at the actual level of spending, 138.2 if 8.5
billion dollars more were spent, and 138.3 if 14.5 billion dollars more
than the actual level were spent.
In addition to the effects on the consumer price index, the
model indicates that at least 80,000 persons joined the ranks of the
unemployed during 1973 as a result of impoundments.
E.

Foreign Relations

Although the impoundments of 8.5 billion dollars, or even 14.5
19. The Chase Econometrics Model, prepared at the Wharton School of Finance, University of Pennsylvania, provides a computerized method of predicting selected economic
variables.
20. Professor Goffman is Chairman of the Economics Department, University of Flor-
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billion dollars, have not demonstrably reduced inflation in the
United States, these actions may have affected the image of the
United States government and economy in the eyes of foreign governments and investors.
The President's vigorous and unilateral actions regarding impoundment may persuade foreign interests to have increased confidence in the ability of the United States to pursue equally decisive
policies in areas of special international concern, such as balance of
payments, tariffs, rates of exchange, and even levels of troops deployed in various parts of the world.
Case law has recognized that the President's inherent power in
foreign affairs is broader than in domestic matters. 21 In order to be
meaningful, however, the doctrine must be limited to situations
directly related to foreign affairs, since virtually every governmental
action has some indirect relationship to foreign affairs. Thus the
President could plausibly invoke his foreign affairs powers in
connection with cutting off funds from a foreign-aid program, but
not in connection with impounding purely domestic programs, even
though the domestic fiscal condition of the United States is a matter
of concern to our overseas image.
F. Legal and ConstitutionalAspects
1.

Constitutional Issues-The text of the Constitution does

not state how much discretion, if any, may be exercised by the
President in carrying out the spending function. Until definitive
court decisions clarify22 the constitutional issues, their resolution
must remain in doubt.

A number of provisions in article I of the Constitution imply
that the President does not have the power to frustrate the intent
of an appropriation act. Article I, section 1 vests the legislative
power in Congress, implying that Congress alone shall determine
21. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936);
Impoundment: Legal Principles,supra note 1, at 199, 200-01.
22. The United States Supreme Court recently agreed for the first time to hear an
impoundment-related case. Train v. City of New York, cert. granted,42 U.S.L.W. 3606, 3610
(U.S. Apr. 29, 1974); Train v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc., cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3607,
3610 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1974). The Court ordered consolidation of the 2 cases. The Court declined
to exercise its original jurisdiction in Georgia v. Nixon, 414 U.S. 810 (1973), a suit brought
by the State of Georgia, both as parenspatriaeand on the basis of the proprietary interests
of the state itself.
The most comprehensive collection of impoundment cases decided by the lower federal
courts is L. FISHER, COURT CASES ON IMPOUNDMENT OF FUNDS: A PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS,
(Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, multilith, March 15, 1974).
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national policy, except in those situations in which another branch
of government has been given authority to do so, namely, when a
veto is sustained, when a statute is declared unconstitutional, or
when the Constitution expressly commits certain policymaking
power to another branch. Article I also empowers Congress to override vetoes,2 3 levy taxes, 4 appropriate funds, 5 and pass laws deemed
"necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." 6 The group of article I powers strongly implies that the
framers intended to give Congress the full "power of the purse,"
which logically extends beyond the appropriation process to include
the execution of appropriations.
Article II establishes the powers of the President and has been
cited in support of both sides of the current impoundment controversy. Section 1 vests the executive power in the President. President Nixon has asserted that the exercise of discretion in spending
funds is part of the inherent executive power committed to the
President by this section.? Among the District Court judges who
have rejected this argument, Judge Richey has stated that it was
"not within the discretion of the Executive to refuse to execute laws
passed by Congress but with which the Executive presently disagrees. ' 28 In National Council of Community Mental Health Centers
v. Weinberger, Judge Gesell rejected the Government's claim that
there was "inherent constitutional power in the Executive to decline
to spend in the face of a clear statutory intent and directive to do
S0.129

The administration's action in withholding funds was not

"supported by Article H of the Constitution, nor any other authority," said Judge Hart in American Association of Colleges of Podiatric Medicine v. Ash.10 In Guadamuz v. Ash, Judge Flannery specifi23. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7.
24. Id. § 8.

25. Id. &§ 8.9.
26. Id. § 8.
27. In his news conference of January 31, 1973, President Nixon asserted that the
"constitutional right for the President of the United States to impound funds . . . not to
spend money, when the spending of money would mean either increasing prices or increasing
taxes for all the people . . . is absolutely clear." 9 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL
DOCUMENTS 11 (1973). See also 1973 Impoundment Hearings,supranote 4, at 270 (statement
by OMB Director Roy Ash); id. at 369 (statement by Deputy Attorney General Joseph
Sneed).
28. Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363, 1372 (D.D.C. 1973).
29. 361 F. Supp. 897, 901 (D.D.C. 1973).
3p. Civil No. 1139-73 at 3 (D.D.C., October 26, 1973), cited in L. FISHER, supra note

22, at 82.
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cally rejected the notion of an inherent presidential power to impound, stating: "Money has been appropriated by the Congress to
achieve the purposes of both programs and the Executive has no
residual constitutional power to refuse to spend these appropriations.""
The President has also placed heavy reliance upon article II,
section 3, which requires the President to "take care that the laws
be faithfully executed." According to the President, this section
authorizes him to exercise discretion in carrying out the spending
function, so as to "harmonize" the appropriation acts with various
general statutes dealing with macro-fiscal matters, such as the debt
limit, the Employment Act and the Economic Stabilization Act.32
If total appropriations exceed these macro-fiscal limitations, the
President claims the power to harmonize by scaling down appropriations-and by making the reductions according to his own sense
of priorities. An equally strong argument can be made, however, for
interpreting the "faithfully execute" clause as requiring the President to make a good faith effort to carry out the intent of Congress.
If Congress enacts a series of laws in irreconcilable conflict, the
President should, under this view, return to Congress for resolution,
rather than make a unilateral decision to harmonize the laws by
reducing spending in programs he selects for reduction.
The lower federal courts have consistently rejected the President's assertions that the "faithfully execute" clause authorizes
impoundment. In State Highway Commission v. Volpe, the Eighth
Circuit observed that the Anti-Deficiency Act must be interpreted
in order to avoid violating the purposes and objectives of the appropriations at issue.? In Massachusetts v. Weinberger, the District
Court found no language in the Anti-Deficiency Act or the Employment Act to support the President's contention. 4 These decisions
31. 368 F. Supp. 1233, 1244 (D.D.C. 1973).
32. Office of Management and Budget, Budgetary Reserves as of February4, 1974, 39
Fed. Reg. 7708 (1974) (hereinafter cited as OMB Report, Feb. 4, 1974). This report sets forth
a series of reasons in support of the reserves established by OMB. The general introduction
to the report states: "From time to time, reserves are established for the purpose of conforming to the requirements of other laws. An example is the Executive's responsibility to stay
within the statutory limitation on the outstanding public debt." 39 Fed. Reg. 7708. The major
statutes relied upon by the OMB in this connection are the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 665 (1970), the debt ceiling, 31 U.S.C. § 757(b) (Supp. H 1972), the Employment Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1021-25 (1970), and the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, 12
U.S.C. 1094 (Supp. II, 1972). These statutes, and the Executive's reliance upon them, are
discussed in Impoundment: Legal Principles,supra note 1, at 202-06.
33. 479 F.2d 1099, 1118 (8th Cir. 1973).
34. Civil No. 1308-73 (D.D.C. 1973), cited in L. FISHER, supra note 22, at 83.
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and others35 necessarily imply that the President has no constitutional power to harmonize in such a manner as to violate congressional intent.
The President's special powers as Commander-in-ChieP and as
spokesman in foreign affairs" may give him broader discretion over
spending in these areas than in others. The controversy over impoundment, however, has emphasized non-military, domestic programs, and these special powers are therefore not currently at issue.
The doctrine of separation of powers can be invoked on either
side of the impoundment controversy. If the Constitution is regarded as conferring discretion upon the President in the execution
of appropriations, the notion of the separation of powers can be
invoked to preclude Congress from interfering-hence any congressional attempt to prevent or control impoundment would be unconstitutional. On the other hand, if the Constitution is regarded as
empowering Congress not only to appropriate but also to control the
manner in which the appropriation is executed, Congress must provide adequate guidelines to the executive officials responsible for
executing the appropriation. The failure to provide adequate guidelines may be regarded as an abdication of legislative responsibility.
This could be cured in part by the establishment of certain procedures, imposed by Congress or by the President if Congress fails to
do so, thus assuring the orderly exercise of discretion. 8 Although the
separation of powers question is unlikely to persuade a court to
invalidate appropriation acts that fail to provide standards or procedures, the topic raises questions of political accountability.
2. Congressionalintent as expressed in the appropriationact
and authorization acts-Having concluded, in general, that the
President must conform to congressional intent, the courts look into
this intent as expressed in the appropriation and authorization acts
and in their underlying legislative history. The basic question is
two-fold: first, how much discretion, if any, did Congress intend to
give the President in executing the various stages of the specific
appropriation at issue; secondly, has the President abused this discretion. This analysis is more subtle than the traditional distinction
35. See cases cited in notes 28-31, supra; Louisiana v. Weinberger, 369 F. Supp. 856
(E.D. La. 1973); Government Employees Local 2677 v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C.
1973).

36. U.S.

CONST.

art. IH,§ 2.

37. Id. §§ 2, 3.
38. On the need to confine and structure the exercise of discretion, either through
statutory guidelines or through agency rules, see K. DAvis, DiscREUrrONARY JUsTIcE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 97 (1969).
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between mandatory and permissive appropriations, which implied
that the President had either no discretion at all (in the case of the
mandatory appropriation) or absolute discretion (in the case of the
permissive appropriation). The newer two-fold test was applied in
two separate cases arising out of the impoundment of clean-water
funds. Two district courts held that the statute conferred some discretion upon the administrator but that this discretion had been
3
abused by his decision to withhold fifty-five percent of the funds. 1
G.

State Governments in the United States

The budget processes of state governments in the United States
suggest some directions for reform of the federal government's
budget system.
1. Publicity of the Process-Statebudget processes generally
give legislators greater access to information than is available to
Congress. In the great majority of the states, the legislature receives
not only the Governor's budget document, but also the original
requests submitted to the Governor by the agencies, which may be
quite different." In many states, agencies are permitted to take their
requests directly to the legislature if the Governor does not include
the full agency request in his budget package." Legislators and their
staffs are often authorized to attend executive budget hearings, although their role is generally limited to observation rather than
participation. Legislative prerogatives also often include the right to
exacquire budgetary information from subordinate officials in the
42
ecutive branch as well as from the central budget office itself.
Legislative access to information often extends not only to the
preparation but also to the execution of the budget. Legislators
commonly have access to detailed accounting records of allotments
and disbursements and regular reports of expenditures are provided
in many states.4" Additionally, seven states impose specific require39. Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689, 700 (E.D. Va. 1973);
Minnesota v. Fri, No. 4-73 Civ. 133 (D. Minn. 1973) mem. op. at 13, cited in L. FISHER, supra
note 22, at 88.
40. TAX FOUNDATION, STATE EXPENDITURE CoNTRoLs: AN EVALUATION 25-26 (1965) (hereinafter cited as TAX FOUNDATION). The findings of the Tax Foundation, in this respect as in
many others, are supported by the responses received from 46 states to a questionnaire
distributed in 1973 to the legislative appropriation committee and to the executive budget
agency of each state by the McIntosh Executive Impoundment Project, tabulated by Douglas
Crow and Malcolm Steinberg (hereinafter cited as McIntosh state questionnaire).
41. See materials cited in note 40 supra.
42. This is normally accomplished through the process of legislative committee hearings. McIntosh state questionnaire, note 40 supra.
43. Monthly computer reports of expenditures are provided in at least 6 states: Idaho,
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ments upon the Governor to report the withholding of funds, either
4
before or after the fact.
2. Preparationof the Budget-State legislative modernization
has brought some significant changes in committee organization.
Fifteen states have adopted joint senate-house appropriation committees,4 5 and in four of those states the appropriation and taxation
functions are combined. 46 Increasingly, the trend is to provide permanent professional staffing for fiscal47 committees, often in the form
of a central legislative budget office.
Most state legislatures enact an omnibus appropriation, subject to an item veto by the Governor. Typically, the item veto allows
the Governor to eliminate individual lines in the appropriation bill,
but in eight states the Governor may choose either to eliminate or
to reduce, and in some states he may veto provisos or statements of
intent included in the appropriation bill.48
Despite its widespread availability, the item veto is infrequently used, but when used is rarely overridden. In a small number
of states the item veto has been extensively used, especially in those
states with the "reduction" item veto.49
3. Execution of the Budget-States generally have not been
faced with "impoundment" problems. State statutes often place
restrictions on the executive authority to approve allotments, auMaryland, Massachusetts, Montana, South Dakota and Vermont. Regular reports are also
required in Kansas, Michigan, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington and Wyoming. McIntosh
state questionnaire, note 40 supra.
44. Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Virginia and Washington. McIntosh state
questionnaire, note 40 supra.
45. Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah and Wisconsin. McIntosh
state questionnaire, note 40 supra.
46. Alabama, Louisiana, New York, Wisconsin. McIntosh state questionnaire, note 40
supra.
47. CoUNcIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1972-73, at 81-82 (1972).
48. Thirty-seven states were reported as using the omnibus appropriation bill in 1965.
TAX FOUNDATION, note 40 supra. This result is generally supported by the McIntosh state
questionnaire. Of the 37 states responding to the question whether the omnibus appropriation
is used, 20 replied affirmatively, another 4 reported the omnibus system was in general use,
subject to special separate appropriations for new programs, and 13 reported no omnibus
appropriation system.
The item veto is provided in 43 states, including 8 states which permit a reduction veto.
THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1972-73, supra note 47, at 72-73.
49. The McIntosh state questionnaire obtained the following responses: (a) "Is the item
veto ever used?" Of 30 states responding, 15 replied "rarely." (b) "Is the item veto ever
overridden?" Of 10 states responding, 7 replied "very rarely." Extensive use of the item veto
was reported by California, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Texas and Washington. McIntosh state questionnaire, note 40 supra.
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thorize fund transfers, or withhold funds to prevent deficits. In some
states, impoundments can be made only on an across-the-board
basis."
The existence of legislative oversight committees and the availability of attorney general opinions or judicial review appear to have
placed significant limits on the discretion exercised by Governors in
the execution of their budgets.
Although conflicts resulting in controversial impoundments
have arisen in some states, 51 the openness of the process during
preparation of the budget, and the availability of the item veto, tend
to reduce the risk of conflict between legislature and Governor in the
execution of the budget.
4. Limited Relevance of State Experience as a Model for Federal Reform-Many of the devices used by state governments have
implications as potential methods of reform of the federal budget
system. Their significance, however, is limited in view of the limited
responsibilities of state governments as compared to the federal
government. Only the federal government is responsible for defense,
the international balance of payments, nationwide price levels, and
other problems of national scope. The federal government may well
require unique systems in order to perform its unique functions.
H. Comparative Study of Foreign Governments
A study of the budget processes of Great Britain, France and
West Germany 2 indicates that in all three systems, the executive
dominates the process of introducing appropriations proposals into
the legislature. In addition, once an appropriation has been enacted,
the executive enjoys considerable but not absolute discretion in deciding whether to spend the total amount of funds appropriated. In
all three countries, the executive is permitted and indeed expected
to reduce the level of spending when considerations of prudent and
efficient administration so require, that is, when the legislative program can be carried out at lower cost than originally anticipated,
the concept previously referred to as "variance." The executive in
50. Georgia, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina and Utah. McIntosh state questionnaire, note 40 supra.

51. Florida and Illinois reported serious and recurring problems. McIntosh state questionnaire, note 40 supra.
52. The comparative study, summarized here by the present authors, was conducted
by Hans W. Baade, Professor of Law, University of Texas, in conjunction with the McIntosh
Foundation Executive Impoundment Project. The study includes Canada as well as Britain,
France and West Germany. The full text of Professor Baade's report has been published in
60 VA. L. REv. 393-450, 611-63 ('1974).
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all three countries also enjoys limited discretion to reduce spending
for specific programs in order to keep total spending within acceptable macroeconomic limits. It seems generally understood, however,
that the executive will attempt to fulfill rather than frustrate the
intent of the legislature.
Each of the three countries has a parliamentary system of government, in which the executive (the "government") is part of the
legislative branch, subject to removal by a simple vote of "no confidence." The legislature thus possesses an ultimate sanction that
demands executive deference to policies of the legislative majority.
This sanction carries built-in restraints, since the legislator who
votes no confidence in his government faces the prospect of parliamentary dissolution, by which his own tenure of office is prematurely ended.
The European countries favor intermediate-term (five-year)
plans, as the basis for annual budgets. Special attention is paid to
the need to keep inflation within tolerable limits, if possible, and
to provide sufficient flexibility in the budget system to respond to
whatever inflation is experienced during the budget cycle.
I.

Proposed CongressionalReforms

The House in December 1973 and the Senate in March 1974
passed different versions of bills. to reform the budget process and
control impoundment. 3 At the time of writing, the bills are being
considered by a conference committee.
Both bills represent the culmination of reform efforts during the
past two years, when dozens of proposals were introduced. The impetus for reform has undoubtedly been the impoundment controversy, and the President deserves some credit for having jolted Congress into a long overdue reform of its budget process. 4
Both bills combine budget reform and impoundment control in
a single package, emphasizing reform of the spending function.
Other features shared by both bills include: the creation of a budget
committee in each House; the creation of a professional budget staff
in Congress; the adoption of tentative totals, at the beginning of
each year's budget season, setting targets for appropriations, revenues and debt; the continuation of the existing practice of piecemeal
action on appropriations, in as many separate bills as Congress
chooses to process; the ability of Congress to amend the target total
53.
54.

S. 1541, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973); H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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figures at any time; the change of the fiscal year to October 1; and
the imposition of some types of control over impoundment of funds
by the President."
The greatest differences between the Senate and House bills are
in their respective provisions on impoundment. 6 These bills will be
discussed, in more detail, in context of our recommendations for
reform of the budget process.
General Evaluation of Current Situation
The friction built into our system of separation of powers can
be expected to be especially severe when, as at present, the President and the congressional majority are of opposite political parties.
The recent confrontations over the impoundment issue, however,
have reached serious proportions. When President and Congress
assert conflicting policies and priorities regarding governmental
spending, citizen confidence in government itself is likely to be undermined, especially when the President resolves the conflict by his
own unilateral action, on the basis of procedures that pose an unacceptable risk of abuse within the executive branch.
A Congressman recently described the current system as one in
which "Congress gets credit for voting the funds while the President
takes Congress off the hook by refusing to spend them." 57 The pending House and Senate bills permit cautious optimism that a more
responsible view is gaining ground. The committee reports, moreover, suggest that these bills are intended merely as first stages of
more comprehensive reforms, to be undertaken over a period of
5
years.
Many features of the pending bills closely resemble the corresponding provisions in the recommendations that follow, and the
similarities will be noted in the commentary following the recomJ.

55. S. 1541; H.R. 7130.
56. S. 1541, § 1001; H.R. 7130, §§ 201-06.
57. Congressman Robinson, quoted in PreliminaryFindings,supra note 15, at S 21123.
58. The report on S. 1541 by the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration states:
The Committee recognizes that as Congress gains experience with its new budget
process, it may consider it desirable to supplement the procedures established in S. 1541
with additional enforcement methods. The substitute bill provides that the first budget
resolution may require-for the fiscal year to which it applies-additional procedures
such as an omnibus appropriation bill, a triggering clause in appropriation bills, or
holding appropriation and spending bills at the enrolling desk until Congress has approved the second budget resolution and any required reconciliation measure. Thus, the
substitute bill allows for the evolutionary development of the congressional budget process, rather than an all-at-once implementation.
S. Rep. No. 688, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974).
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mendations. In general, however, our recommendations propose
more comprehensive controls on both Congress and the President
than are provided in the pending bills. Until comprehensive reforms
are written into law, and until Congress and the President have
demonstrated themselves willing and able to comply with the discipline of a reformed system, citizen confidence is unlikely to be restored.
II.

Recommendations for Budget Reform and Impoundment
Control

The discussion will deal with five major topics: (A) regularized
and public procedures throughout the budget process; (B) budget
preparation; (C) enactment of appropriations; (D) execution of appropriations; and (E) budget-related litigation. Commentary is submitted for each recommendation in the context of a critical description of existing practice.
A.

Regularized and Public Procedure Throughout Budget Process

From beginning to end, the budget process involves a blend of
functions of Congress and the executive branch. Each branch should
have full and prompt access to information developed by the other,
and each branch should function in accordance with a regularized
process. The public should have the maximum possible access to
records and hearings on the budget, consistent with the requirements of national security and other legitimate reasons for confidentiality.
RECOMMENDATION 1. PROCEDURE WITHIN EXECUTIVE BRANCH
(a) The President and other officials in the executive
branch should prepare and execute the budget in accordance
with regularized procedures and timetables.
(b) The President and other officials in the executive
branch should compile and maintain documentary records of
information and opinion concerning major decisions made during the preparation and execution of the budget.
Commentary
(a) Executive processes in the preparationof the budget are
organized and scheduled on a regular basis. The process extends
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from well in advance of the affected fiscal year when agency proposals are formulated for submission to the OMB, to the time when the
President's budget is submitted to Congress."
Executive processes in the execution of the budget are also
organized to some extent. A large amount of ad hoc decision-making
involving impoundment, however, takes place at irregular intervals.60 While flexibility is valuable in dealing with changing circumstances, the relatively unscheduled tempo of decision-making during the execution of the budget raises questions concerning the quality and the integrity of decisions made under this system. Field
research indicates that some important decisions have been made
without adequate documentation, deliberation or review. The quality of decisions made under these circumstances is highly questionable. Further, questions of integrity arise, since certain individuals
with inside informatimn have found methods of discovering the
dates and whereabouts of crucial meetings and the means of reaching the decision-makers.
(b) Documentary records are prepared during the preparation
and execution of the budget and are kept highly confidential.6'
Sources indicate that detailed analyses are prepared at various
agency levels and compiled by the OMB, dealing with various aspects of selected actual and proposed programs, including political
cost-benefit analyses. Although some decisions are supported by
these secret documents, other important decisions have been made
without any substantial documentation at the time of the decision. 2
Sound administration requires that all relevant documents be compiled in advance of decision making; that they actually be used as
a means of arriving at the decision; and that they be preserved as a
means of facilitating subsequent review of the decision.
RECOMMENDATION 2.
EXECUTIVE BRANCH

PUBLICITY OF FUNCTIONS OF

(a) The President and other officials in the executive
branch should make the records of the preparation and the execution of the budget fully available to Congress and to the
public, except that public access may be precluded to the extent
59. Current statutory provisions regarding the President's budget message are found at
31 U.S.C. § 11 (1970).
60. PreliminaryFindings,supra note 15, at S 21122-23.
61. Id. at S 21122.
62. The accompanying text is based upon confidential interviews conducted by the
authors during the McIntosh Foundation Executive Impoundment Project, 1973.
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such records are properly classified in accordance with strict
guidelines.
(b) The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should
conduct hearings at certain stages of the preparation of the
budget and, if feasible, at certain stages of the execution of the
budget. All OMB hearings should be fully open to observation
by both Congress and the public except that the public may be
excluded for a proper reason in accordance with strict
guidelines.
Commentary
(a) As previously indicated, OMB maintains tight secrecy
with respect to the documents it compiles during the preparation
and execution of the budget with even Congress denied access to
some of these documents. Further, OMB director's review sessions
and other budget-related meetings are closed.
Other documents, such as the President's budget message, are
released. The final results of the execution of the budget become
matters of public information, in aggregate form, when the Treasury
Department issues its reports of revenues and expenditures. In addition, pursuant to the Impoundment and Information Act of 1972,13
the OMB publishes a quarterly statement of budgetary "reserves." 4
However, the documents containing the facts and opinions that
went into the various decisions made during the budget process are
kept secret.
Increased publicity of the entire process would facilitate higher
level executive evaluation of tentative decisions made at lower levels; would facilitate congressional evaluation of crucial decisions;
and would enhance the public accountability of those who make the
decisions. Admittedly, certain portions of the record do require confidential treatment because of their sensitive subject-matter; examples include certain aspects of foreign affairs, national security, and
law enforcement. While such materials may justifiably be kept from
public inspection, they should nevertheless be made fully available
to Congress and its agencies.
(b) In the interest of opening up the executive process to
greater scrutiny, there should be publicity not only of OMB documents, but also of OMB hearings, such as the OMB director's review sessions. The publicity of these hearings should be limited only
63.
64.

31 U.S.C. § 581c-1 (Supp. II, 1972).
The most recent is OMB Report Feb. 4, 1974, note 32 supra.
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by the extent to which classified information is likely to be discussed, and even then the hearings should be open to Congress and
its agencies. To avoid bogging the process down, the OMB hearings
should be open to observation only, not participation.
RECOMMENDATION 3. PUBLICITY OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON BUDGET
(a) All documentary records compiled or received by Congress, or by any of its committees or agencies, in connection
with any aspect of the budget. should be made fully available to
the public except to the extent that such records are properly
classified in accordance with strict guidelines.
(b) Congress, or any of its committees and agencies,
should not hold executive sessions at any stage of congressional
consideration of the budget unless a proper reason, in accordance with strict guidelines, is stated for excluding the public.
Commentary

(a) The appropriations committees receive information partly
on a government-wide basis from OMB and partly on an agency-byagency basis during legislative hearings on specific programs. While
most of the information compiled by these committees is readily
available to Congress and the public, the House Appropriations
Committee does maintain secret files for some of the information it
compiles. 5 In addition, both appropriations committees conduct
some of their proceedings in the secret format of executive sessions.
(b) Except for those types of information that require confidentiality, all congressional files and hearings should be open to the
public as a means of maximizing both congressional accountability
and citizen confidence.
The Senate bill moves in this direction, by requiring all meetings of the budget committees and their subcommittees to be open
to the public, except in designated circumstances. 6
B.

Budget Preparation

The President's budget message provides volumes of useful
information, but it could be made even more informative for subsequent congressional and public evaluation.
65. The accompanying text is based upon confidential interviews conducted by the
authors during the McIntosh Foundation Executive Impoundment Project, 1973.
66. S. 1541, § 101(d).
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RECOMMENDATION 4.
BUDGET MESSAGE
(a)

FORMAT OF PRESIDENT'S

The President's budget message should include:

(i) The recommended manner in which appropriation
items would be changed, if the total outlays for the ensuing
fiscal year were either five percent greater or five percent
less than the recommended total;
(ii) Macroeconomic discussion, including alternatives
and recommendations;
(iii) Presentation of the anticipated goals and achievements as well as the required resources for major programs.
(b) The President's budget message should conform to
those changes in congressional procedures and timetables that
are proposed elsewhere in these recommendations.
Commentary
(a) Some of the President's most difficult decisions in formulating his budget involve those programs he considers to be of marginal importance. The President's budget would be more useful if
it identified those programs. This presentation could be made by
including in the budget the President's proposal for making changes
if the total outlays were slightly greater or slightly less than he
recommends. The figure of five percent for the size of the margin is
advanced as a reasonable one, but any other factor could be used if
it were demonstrably more useful. In addition, outlays rather than
new budget authority are suggested as the basis for computing the
five percent margin, since the major disputes in the recent battle of
the budget have centered around outlays which are the relevant
item for macroeconomic planning."
(b) Later proposals require Congress to consider fiscal policy
on a macro level by setting total levels of outlay, new budget authority, revenue, debt, and surplus or deficit, before acting on individual
programs." In order to carry out this responsibility, Congress needs
the benefit of the President's macroeconomic recommendations,
documented as fully as possible, and integrated with the budget
message. Current practice concentrates the macroeconomic report
67. Recommendation 8, infra, provides that outlays as well as new budget authority
should be included in appropriation acts.
68. See Recommendation 7, infra.
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in a separate message, given at a different time."
(c) During the in-house preparation of budget requests within
the executive branch, program goals are often submitted and used
as the basis for recommendations."0 The President's budget itself,
however, abandons much of the program identification that was
contained in the underlying requests and continues the practice of
classifying by agency and line item. The agency and line item classification should be retained, but with supplemental presentations
showing goal and achievement-oriented projections."
The Senate bill imposes a requirement along these lines, beginning with the fiscal year ending on September 30, 19792
(d) A number of our recommendations change the procedures
and timetables to be followed by Congress during its action on the
budget. The President's budget message should be adapted accordingly.
C.

Enactment of Appropriations

Having received a single budget proposal from the President,
Congress each year enacts a series of appropriation bills at different
times, making it almost impossible to maintain an overview of total
spending, or to develop a coherent set of priorities. In addition, huge
amounts of expenditures are authorized by "backdoor" procedures
by-passing the appropriations committees until after the obligation
has been incurred.
The following recommendations outline a set of operational
rules and create new congressional committees and staffs, designed
to establish effective congressional control over spending, and provide a framework within which the President can exercise a reasonable amount of discretion.
RECOMMENDATION 5.

TIMETABLE

(a) The fiscal year should be changed to October 1.
69. Currently the President submits a separate economic message pursuant to the
Employment Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25 (1970).
70. This is esiecially the case under the so-called Management-by-Objective system,
currently favored by the OMB. Havemann, OMB Begins Major Program to Identify and
Attain PresidentialGoals, 5 NAT'L. J. 783 (1973); Brady, MBO Goes to Work in the Public
Sector, 51 HARv. Bus. Rev. 65 (Mar.-Apr. 1973).
71. Currently, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 11 (1970), the President's budget message does
not have to include program or mission-oriented presentations. In recent years, the Appendix
to the budget has included some materials of this type.
72. S. 1541, § 6010).
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(b) Congressional action on appropriations should conform to a timetable, which should be suitably enforced.
Commentary
(a) The recommendations, in general, require Congress to
complete a series of rigorous procedures during a "budget season"
that begins with the President's submission of his budget message
to Congress and that should end with enactment of all appropriation
bills before the start of the fiscal year.73 Under current schedules,
the budget season lasts for less than six months, from the submission of the budget in mid-January to the beginning of the fiscal year
on July 1. This season is too short to provide Congress with an
adequate opportunity to complete even its existing processes, and
Congress has been obliged to resort frequently to the continuing
resolution as a means of providing the temporary continuation of
programs for which appropriations could not be enacted before July
The budget season could be lengthened by requiring the President to submit his budget earlier than January. This, however,
would result in submission of the budget either during December
(typically, a month when thoughts of adjournment are prevelent) or
during November (dominated by elections). The alternative method
of lengthening the budget season is by changing the end of the fiscal
year from July 1 to a later date. Both bills pending in Congress
select this method of lengthening the season, and both select
October 1 as the beginning of the fiscal year.7 5 This appears to be a
reasonable and practical solution.
Both pending congressional bills additionally provide detailed
timetables, requiring each stage of congressional action on the
budget to be completed by a certain date during the budget season.
Our proposed timetable is set forth following the comments to Recommendation 7.
(b) Neither of the pending bills provides a mechanism for
enforcing the timetable, except that Congress is prevented from
73. See Recommendation 7, infra, and the proposed timetable for appropriations following the commentary to Recommendation 7.
74. Report of Senate Rules Committee on S. 1541 states that for fiscal years 1964-1973
only 7 out of 129 appropriation bills were approved prior to July 1. S. Rep. No. 688, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 62 (1974). See also H.R. Rep. No. 658, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1973): "The Committee hopes that this revised time-table [changing the fiscal year to October 1] will put an
end to continuing resolutions and the uncertainty which they bring."
75. S.1541, § 501; H.R. 7130, § 151.
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adjourning until after completion of all stages of the budget process.
The recommendations in this article include a number of mechanisms designed to enforce the timetable. Recommendation 7(g) creates a two-thirds majority requirement for enactment of any appropriation in the form of a continuing resolution, and 7(h) requires a
two-thirds majority for enactment of any appropriation outside the
budget season unless the measure includes provision for full coverage by new revenues. These proposals place heavy pressure upon
Congress to complete the budget process on schedule, within the
budget season.
Other enforcement mechanisms also might be considered. As
one approach, the rules of each House could provide that if either
House falls behind its timetable, that House could not consider any
business other than the budget, with a two-thirds vote necessary for
waiver of this rule.
RECOMMENDATION 6.
TION AND STAFF

CONGRESSIONAL ORGANIZA-

(a) A budget committee should be created as a standing
committee in each house of Congress. Each budget committee
should report regarding tentative budget totals and should perform functions discussed elsewhere in these recommendations.
The two budget committees should jointly supervise the operation of the congressional budget office.
(b) A congressional budget office should be created and
staffed in a nonpartisan, professional manner. The office should
analyze budget data received from the executive branch, develop its own data, keep score of congressional and executive
action on all aspects of the budget, and furnish Congress with
information and opinions on budgetary matters.
Commentary
(a) In each house of Congress, the spending function is handled by an appropriations committee, while the revenue function is
handled by a separate committee (Finance in the Senate, Ways and
Means in the House). Congress should be required, at the beginning
and again at the end of each budget season, to receive an overview
report from a committee which can coordinate revenues and expenditures."8 Only a committee combining both revenue and ex76.

See Recommendation No. 7, infra.
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penditure jurisdiction could adequately perform this function. Each
pending congressional bill provides for the creation of a new committee in each house. 7' The primary function of each proposed
budget committee is to coordinate total spending with revenues,
debt, and surplus or deficit. The existing committees' handling of
revenues and expenditures is left virtually intact.
The existing committees should survive, and a new committee
in each house should undertake the proposed new coordinating
function. Separation between the budget committees of the two
houses is desirable because of the special constitutional responsibility of the House to initiate tax measures, 78 the tradition by which
the House initiates appropriation measures,'7 and the risk that a
joint Senate-House budget committee could turn out to be unworkable. s0
The Senate bill creates a fifteen-member budget committee,
while the House bill creates a twenty-three-member committee.
Each of these proposed committees is small enough to work
effectively, as contrasted with past reform attempts which would
have created unwieldly budget committees consisting of all members of the appropriations committees plus all members of the Finance or Ways and Means Committees.8 ' The bills differ with respect to both eligibility and the method of appointment of budget
committee members. Whatever method is used, each budget committee should include significant but not dominant representation
from the Appropriations and Finance or Ways and Means
Committees.
(b) In order to deal effectively with the proposed new coordinating function, Congress will need not only a budget committee in
each house, but also a staff agency of substantial size. The staffs of
the existing Appropriations and Finance or Ways and Means
Committees can hardly be expected to perform the new task. These
staffs will continue to serve the needs of their respective committees, which will continue their existing functions. The General Ac77.
78.

79.

S. 1541, § 101; H.R. 7130, § 111.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7.
R. FENNO, THE POWER OF THE PURSE 639-40 (1966); CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE

185-86 (1971).
80. For a discussion of the success of this mechanism in state governmental budget
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processes, see Preliminary Findings, supra note 15, at S 21125, and text accompanying note
45 supra.
81. See Leiserson, Coordinationof FederalBudgetary and Appropriations Procedures
Under the Legislative ReorganizationAct of 1946, 1 NAT'L TAx J. 118 (1948).
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counting Office could feasibly be expanded to fill the new staff role,
but the large size of GAO and its general emphasis on post-audit
rather than on planning preclude it from being the obvious choice.
Both pending bills provide for the creation of a nonpartisan,
professional congressional budget office to serve as a congressional
counterpart of the OMB, under the general supervision of the
budget committees of the two houses.8 2 The bills differ as to method
of appointment of the director and the scope of his powers. By
whatever method these details are resolved, the director must enjoy
a significant amount of independence, have unlimited access to all
government documents, and be assisted by a staff of adequate size
and qualifications.
RECOMMENDATION 7.
APPROPRIATIONS

PROCEDURE FOR ENACTING

(a) The appropriations process should be the exclusive
means of authorizing budget authority or outlays.
(b) Congress should adopt tentative budget totals before
voting on individual appropriation items.
(c) Congress should revise the tentative budget totals after
voting on individual appropriation items, and should submit a
draft omnibus appropriation bill, not enrolled, to the President
for comment only, not signature.
(d) The President should then have an opportunity to request congressional reconsideration of any item or part of any
item in the draft omnibus appropriation bill, and his request for
reconsideration should have the effects stated in the following
subsection, provided that the President does not request reconsideration of items that, in the aggregate, would reduce total
outlays for the ensuing fiscal year by more than five percent.
(e) After receiving reports from the budget committees on
the President's request for reconsideration, Congress should
reconsider and vote separately on each item or part of an item
in the President's request for reconsideration, and the draft
omnibus appropriation bill should be modified to eliminate any
item or part of an item which fails to receive a two-thirds majority upon reconsideration.
(f) Congress should then enact an omnibus appropriation
bill, consistent with the draft appropriation bill, except as modified by Congress upon reconsideration pursuant to the President's request.
82.

S. 1541, § 201; H.R. 7130, § 171.

19741

BUDGET REFORM

(g) A two-thirds majority should be required for the enactment of any appropriation in the form of a continuing resolution,
and no continuing resolution should permit the President to take
action after the enactment of the continuing resolution reducing
its amount, by budget amendment or otherwise.
(h) A two-thirds majority should be required for the enactment of any appropriation which is voted upon separately from
the omnibus appropriation bill, unless the measure includes
provision for full coverage by new revenues.
Commentary
(a) Current practice permits "backdoor" authorization of
spending through legislation which does not go through the appropriations process until after the financial obligation has been incurred. 3 By this time, of course, appropriation becomes a perfunctory matter, required in order to avoid default on obligations. In
order to achieve full and effective congressional control over all
aspects of spending, the back door must be closed, and all legislation dealing with budget authority or outlays must be channelled
through the appropriations process, subject to coordination by the
budget committees.
The proposals pending in both houses provide, in principle, for
the elimination of backdoor spending. This is, however, subject to
certain exceptions and long phase-out periods. 4 Backdoor spending
should be completely eliminated within a phase-out period of no
longer than one year.
(b) Although it receives a single budget proposal from the
President each year, Congress then fragments the process, enacting
thirteen major appropriation bills at different times, this in addition
to massive backdoor authorizations.8 5 Both bills pending in Congress require, early in the budget season, the adoption of a concurrent resolution setting tentative totals of outlays, new budget authority, revenues, debt, and surplus or deficit.8 6 Under each proposal
these tentative totals are subject to revision after the completion of
83. S. Rep. No. 688, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1974). "The Committee is mindful that
backdoor spending-spending outside the appropriations process-has emerged in recent
years as a principal impediment to comprehensive budget control."
84. S. 1541, § 401; H.R. 7130, § 141.
85. "The very first act of Congress in consideration of the budget is to fracture it into a
dozen or more separate appropriation bills, an uncounted number of special measures outside
the appropriations process, and a huge and growing portion that is converted into budget
authority without any current action by Congress." S. Rep. No. 579, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1973).
86. S. 1541, § 301; H.R. 7130, § 121.
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action on all appropriation items.
Budget totals should indeed be adopted at the beginning of the
budget season. These totals are essential to any system that would
allow Congress the opportunity to consider fiscal policy on a macro
level before allocating priorities among competing programs at the
micro level. The totals adopted at the beginning of the budget season should be tentative and not rigid. Congress needs the opportunity to reconsider its totals after the competing programs have been
individually considered so that final priorities can be established;
not only as between one spending measure and another, but also as
between spending, taxation, and debt in their aggregates.
(c) After adopting the tentative totals at the beginning of the
budget season, considering all appropriation measures in detail and
reconsidering the budget totals in light of the detailed appropriations, Congress should prepare a draft omnibus appropriation bill,
including all proposed appropriations in a single measure that reflects the revised budget total established in the priority reconsideration process.
Neither of the existing reform proposals adopts this approach,
although the Senate bill permits the first budget resolution for any
year to provide for an omnibus appropriation for that year. On the
contrary, both proposals permit appropriations to be passed by Congress and sent to the President piecemeal, with the result that aside
from some restrictions imposed by the House bill, some appropriations could become law before the entire appropriations process has
been completed. 87 The committee reports recognize that priorities
may need to be reconsidered after action on all appropriations has
been completed, and they suggest that the earlier-enacted appropriations can, if necessary, be partially rescinded if their priorities are
downgraded upon reconsideration. 8
The omnibus appropriation bill is a much more effective
method of resolving priorities. Representative Clarence Cannon,
who persuaded Congress to enact an omnibus appropriation bill in
1950,89 stated that the omnibus system had been an ambition of the
House Appropriations Committee since the drafting of the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921.11 The omnibus system was abandoned
87. S. Rep. No. 688, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974); H.R. Rep. No. 658, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 40 (1973).
88. Id.
89. CONG. REc., June 24, 1949, p. 8388, cited in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATION, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(COMM. PRINT 1961) [hereinafter cited as FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT].

231-32

90. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., remains
the basic framework of the federal government's budget system.
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after 1950, apparently because a number of congressmen considered
the system unduly limited opportunities for floor discussion and
amendment of specific items." The omnibus appropriation system
has been frequently advocated, both before and after 1950.92 The
favorable experience of the majority of states,93 as well as numerous
foreign jurisdictions,94 suggests that the method is practical.
One of the classical arguments against the omnibus appropriation bill is that it limits the President to an all-or-nothing veto, since
he does not have constitutional authority to veto individual items
within an appropriation bill. 5 According to this argument, the omnibus appropriation is effective in state governments only because
most state constitutions confer the item veto power upon the governor.
The omnibus appropriation should be considered in conjunction with the item veto. We propose the introduction of both mechanisms into the federal process-an omnibus appropriation bill, accompanied by a presidential item veto, exercisable subject to congressional override by a two-thirds majority.
In 1873 President Grant recommended a constitutional amendment which would give the president an item veto over all types of
legislation, including appropriation bills. Presidents Hayes, Arthur, F.D. Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower subsequently recommended that the President have the item veto power, at least over
appropriations." A tally prepared in 1963 showed that 147 proposals
had been introduced in Congress recommending a constitutional
amendment which would allow the President to exercise an item
veto, either over all legislation or over appropriation bills only. 8
Some of the proposals included the power to reduce as well as to
91. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 89, at 233.
92. See FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 89, at 229-36; CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
GUIDE TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 190 (1971); Nelson, The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950, 15 J. POL. 274 (1953); E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 284
(1940); S. Rep. No. 579, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1973); H.R. Rep. No. 658, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 28 (1973); J. SALOMA, THE RESPONSIBLE USE OF POWER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS 58-63 (1964).
93. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
94. See generally Baade, supra note 52, at 393 et seq.
95. H.R. Rep. No. 658, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973); S. Rep. No. 688, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1974).
96. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 89, at 238-39.
97. Id. at 238-40.
98. Up to 1929, 70 measures were introduced. M. Musmanno, Proposed Amendments
to the Constitution, H.R. Doc. No. 551, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 69-70 (1929). Between 1929 and
1963, another 77 were introduced. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, S. Doc. No. 163, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 261 (1963). On the item veto, see
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eliminate an item. Only one such proposal has gotten as far as being
considered on the floor of either house of Congress, and that was
defeated in 1883.19
In response to the inability to obtain the item veto by constitutional amendment, its advocates have from time to time proposed
to achieve a similar result by some other means."0 In his 1939
10
budget message, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated: ' "A
respectable difference of opinion exists as to whether a[n] . . .
item veto power could be given to the President by legislation or
whether a constitutional amendment would be necessary. I strongly
recommend that the present Congress adopt whatever course it may
deem to be the correct one." Various types of legislation have been
proposed, none successfully.
If the item veto can be provided only by constitutional amendment, such an amendment should be adopted in order to place the
nation's budgetary process on a sound basis.
It seems, however, that the equivalent of an item veto over
appropriations could be effected without a constitutional amendment, by suitable provisions in the rules of both houses of Congress,
and by suitable procedures during the congressional budget process.
Cases have generally held that Congress can design its own procedures for the enactment of legislation, and the courts generally do
not interfere unless an express provision of the constitution is violated.'0 1 The recommendations herein enable the President to register his objections to items in the draft appropriation bill, subject to
override by a two-thirds congressional vote. Other draftsmen may
well be able to improve upon the mechanism.
As a preliminary matter the omnibus appropriation bill should
be adopted as a draft, not a final document, and should not be
generally Note, The Item Veto in the American Constitutional System, 25 GEO. L.J. 106
(1936); Keating, The Item Veto-A Needed Reform, 7 FED. B. NEWS 104 (1960); Statement
by Elmer Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, in 1973 Impoundment Hearings,

supra note 4, at 101, 110-14;

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT,

supranote 89, at 236-49.

99. Staats, in 1973 Impoundment Hearings,supra note 4, at 111.
100. Id. at 110-14; FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 89, at 240-49; E. CORWIN, TnE
PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 284, 287-89 (1940).

101.

Quoted in

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT,

supra note 89, at 239.

102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 provides: "Each House may determine the Rules of
its Proceedings . . . ." On the relative freedom of legislatures to determine their rules, see
Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963); United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932);
United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); State v. Gray, 221 La. 868, 60 So.2d 466 (1952);
State ex rel. Johnson v. Hagemeister, 161 Neb. 475, 73 N.W.2d 625 (1955); State ex rel.
Coleman v. Lewis, 181 S.C. 10, 186 S.E. 625 (1936); 50 Am. Jur. Statutes § 65 (rules of the
legislature), § 85 (number of votes required) (1964). Certain existing congressional rules
require a two-thirds majority: H.R. Rule 27 (suspension of rules requires two-thirds majority);
S. RULE 22 (cloture requires two-thirds majority). See generally Barnett, The Executive
Control of the Legislature, 41 AM. L. REV. 215 (1907).
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formally enrolled. It should be sent to the President for comment,
not signature. The following discussion outlines the sequels to this
initial submission to the President.
(d) The President should be permitted to request Congress to
reconsider certain items or parts of items in the draft omnibus appropriation bill. In this context, a presidential request for reconsideration should have the effect of requiring Congress either to abandon the item or to reaffirm it by a two-thirds vote.
The President should be able to request reconsideration of any
item or part of an item, thereby achieving a result similar to the
"reduction veto" provided in some states.1 3 The President's power
should, however, be tempered by a percentage limitation, preventing him from requiring reconsideration of massive amounts. Five
percent appears to be a feasible limit; the President should be able
to request reconsideration of items or parts of items aggregating not
more than five percent of the total outlays for the coming fiscal year.
(e) Upon receipt of the President's requests for reconsideration, Congress should receive reports from its budget committees
and should then reconsider the items or parts of items in the President's request. A two-thirds vote should override the President's
request; the analogy to the two-thirds vote needed to override a veto
is evident.
In voting upon the President's requests to reconsider, Congress
should be limited to reconsideration of the "items" or "parts of
items" in the draft appropriation bill, as the President was similarly
limited in the formulation of his requests for reconsideration. This
requirement is proposed in order to prevent the possibility of repackaging the itemized structure of the appropriation bill at this
stage. Congress should not take any action other than the elimination of items or parts of items which fail to receive the two-thirds
vote necessary for their survival after a presidential request to reconsider at this stage of the process. Again, the analogy with the
overriding of a veto is evident; Congress cannot change a bill while
in the process of overriding a veto.
(f) After responding to the President's request to reconsider,
Congress should take final action on the omnibus appropriation bill.
No change should be in order at this stage, since the budget season
is no longer open. The formal appropriation bill should be identical
to the draft, except as modified by congressional failure to override
the President's requests to reconsider.
103. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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The formal omnibus appropriation bill should, and indeed
must be, subject to an all-or-nothing veto, as provided in the
Constitution, the veto, in turn, being subject to an all-or-nothing
override by a two-thirds majority in Congress. The prospect of an
all-or-nothing veto is likely to be reduced by the availability of the
informal method by which the President can force a two-thirds vote
on selected items in the draft omnibus appropriation bill.
(g) Continuing resolutions have been used frequently in recent years as a means of providing stopgap budget authority when
the appropriations process has not been completed by the beginning
of the new fiscal year.104 On occasion the entire fiscal year has been
funded through continuing resolutions dealing with important programs.105 The use of these resolutions is a clear admission of the
inability of Congress and the President to carry out the appropriations process in a timely fashion.
Special problems have arisen where continuing resolutions have
appropriated an indefinite amount, expressed as the total level of
expenditures of the prior year or the amount recommended in the
President's budget for the coming year, whichever is lower. After
enactment of such a resolution, President Nixon reduced his budget
request for the year then in progress and claimed that this action
effectively reduced the amount made available by the continuing
resolution, a retroactive reduction of well over 1 billion dollars.' 6
Despite its undesirable features, the continuing resolution may
be an important safety valve, providing for the continuation of government functions in the event of a legislative impasse at the close
of the fiscal year. The attractiveness to Congress of the continuing
resolution should be reduced by requiring a two-thirds majority for
any such enactment. There should also be a prohibition against any
continuing resolution which permits the President to reduce the
amount of the resolution by budget amendment or otherwise. The
bills pending in Congress make no attempt to eliminate or change
the use of continuing resolutions.
(h) As far as possible, all appropriations should be enacted
during the budget season, culminating in the omnibus appropriation bill. In order to provide the flexibility needed to meet unanticipated circumstances, mechanisms must be available for enacting
appropriations at other times of the year. If off-season appropriations reach significant levels, however, they can jeopardize the fiscal
104.
105.
106.

See note 74 supra.
See note 74 supra; H.R. Rep. No. 658, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1973).
Id. and PreliminaryFindings,supra note 15, at S 21123.
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planning and coordination built into the omnibus appropriation
bill. The availability of off-season appropriations should therefore
be limited. Any such measure, if voted separately from the omnibus
appropriation bill, should require a two-thirds majority unless the
measure includes provision for full coverage by new revenues.10 This
exception is justified since a fully covered measure will have no net
effect on the surplus or deficit planned during the budget season.
A further exception may be required with regard to private bills
for claims against the United States. One possible approach would
be to include in the omnibus appropriation a "reserve" to cover the
estimated amount of claims to be approved during the coming year,
and to draw against this reserve as specific claims are approved. If
the reserve turns out to be inadequate, a supplemental appropriation would be needed, and although a two-thirds majority hardly
seems necessary in such cases, it could no doubt be mustered.
Neither bill pending in Congress makes an attempt to discourage supplemental appropriations. Indeed, both bills permit changes
to be made in the tentative budget totals at any time,0 8 and the
committee reports clearly indicate that supplemental appropriations are anticipated as a recurring feature of the process.'
TIMETABLE: Assuming all recommendations are implemented,
the following timetable for the budgetary process is proposed:
On or before

Action to be completed

April 1

Congress completes action on legislation authorizing
enactment of new budget authority.
Congress completes action on concurrent resolution
setting forth tentative budget totals. [Recommendation 7(b)]
Congress completes action on all appropriation bills,
which are not enrolled, pending completion of
omnibus appropriation process. [Recommendation 7(c)]

May 1

July 1

107. Baade, note 52 supra.
108. S. 1541, § 304; H.R. 7130, § 122(c).
109. S. Rep. No. 688, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1974); H.R. Rep. No. 658, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 32 (1973).
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Congress completes action on draft omnibus appropriation bill, which is not enrolled, and which is
sent to the President for comment, not signature
[Recommendation 7(c)]
President submits comments to Congress regarding
draft omnibus appropriation bill. [Recommendation 7(d)]
Congress completes action on omnibus appropriation
bill. [Recommendation 7(e), (f)]
Fiscal year begins.

RECOMMENDATION 8.
BILLS

FORMAT OF APPROPRIATION

(a) All appropriation bills should include provisions, having the force of law, creating new budget authority and imposing limits on the amount of outlays during the current or ensuing fiscal year.
(b) In addition, all appropriation bills should include
multi-year projections of outlays, which should not have the
force of law.
(c) Zero-based budgeting techniques should be applied to
certain programs selected by Congress each year.
(d) Pilot testing should be provided, if feasible, for certain
new programs selected by Congress each year.
Commentary
(a) Under current practice, an appropriation bill deals only
with the creation of new budget authority. As pointed out in the
report of the Committee on Government Operations on the pending
Senate bill,110 Congress has no control over when the funds shall be
obligated or expended after the appropriation has been enacted.
The lag between appropriations and outlays is illustrated by the
1974 budget. Of the 288 billion dollars in new budget authority, only
174 billion dollars is expected to be used in the current year, with
the balance carrying over to future years. Conversely, almost 95
billion dollars in carryovers is likely to be used in 1974. At the end
of the year, unused carryover authority will exceed 300 billion dollars, almost all of which will be spent in future years.
Both the Senate and House bills provide that the budget total
110.

S. Rep. No. 579, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1973).
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figures, adopted as targets at the beginning of the annual budget
season, should include outlays as well as new budget authority.,
Neither bill, however, requires every appropriation to include outlays as well as new budget authority.
New budget authority should be enacted for as many years as
necessary, and outlay authority should also be enacted, but only for
one year at a time. This limitation will force review of outlays in
each year's appropriations process, with regard to both ongoing
budget authority and newly created budget authority. The process
will become more complex, but the additional complexity is essential in order to establish effective congressional control of the appropriations process. In an appropriations bill enacted during the
budget season, outlays for the ensuing fiscal year should be stated.
In an off-season appropriation, it will probably be more useful to
state outlays for the current fiscal year.
(b) Both bills pending in Congress require preparation of fiveyear projections by the congressional budget office on the basis of
projections submitted by the President, but neither bill requires
Congress to take any action on the out-years."'
Congress should adopt five-year target projections of outlays,
but these target projections for years beyond the current year should
not have legally binding force. As the use of this technique develops,
Congress may ultimately be able to enact complete appropriations
of new budget authority and outlays for periods of more than one
year at a time, subject to supplementation or partial rescission during the annual budget season. Multi-year appropriations for periods
of up to five years are a highly desirable legislative goal that does
not appear to be attainable until experience has first been acquired
with some of the other changes suggested in these recommendations.
(c) The Senate bill calls for further study of methods for establishing maximum and minimum time limitations for program
authorization. I" This provision was adopted as a floor amendment,
to replace the recommendations by the Government Operations
Committee, which would have placed a three-year maximum length
on most major federal programs."' The purpose of the maximum
111. S. 1541, § 301(a)(1); H.R. 7130, § 121(b)(1).
112. S. 1541, § 602(a), 202(e); H.R. 7130, § 173.
113. S. 1541, § 703(a)(6).
114. The zero-based provision was included in the Government Operations Committee
draft of S. 1541, § 801, but was excluded from the Rules Committee draft. The floor amendment, calling for further study, is reported at 120 CONG. REc. S 4017-22 (daily ed. Mar. 20,
1974).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

term, generally known as zero-based budgeting, is to compel thorough evaluation of each major program at least once in each such
term.
The concept of periodic evaluation of major programs is undoubtedly sound. The congressional budget office should, however,
annually recommend programs for thorough evaluation, and Congress itself should make the selection each year, so that current
concerns can be reflected in the selection of programs for evaluation.
(d) The Senate bill also calls for the study of pilot testing, 15'
a provision adopted as a floor amendment, to replace the Government Operations Committee recommendation which would have
required pilot testing of major new programs and expansions of
existing programs.' 6
Congress should engage in pilot testing, but only if it can be
carried out by use of truly meaningful indicators of the social and
other costs and benefits involved, supervised and reported by
impartial professionals. Rather than making pilot testing mandatory from the outset, Congress should determine, from year to year,
the feasibility of pilot testing of designated new programs. The question of feasibility will, inevitably, include political as well as technical feasibility, and this is desirable since the decision to pilot test
rather than to establish the program full-blown will have political
implications that should be faced openly when the decision is made.
D. Execution of Appropriations
If the system for enacting appropriations is redesigned along
the lines suggested in the preceding recommendations, the omnibus
appropriation act will constitute a coherent statement of budgetary
policy, relating the amounts allocated for specific programs at the
micro level to the aggregates of revenue, debt, and expenditure at
the macro level. Once the omnibus appropriation has been enacted,
the President should exercise sound managerial discretion in taking
advantage of cost savings and in scheduling expenditures within the
general framework of congressional intent, but he should not decide
unilaterally that certain programs should be curtailed or eliminated
for macroeconomic reasons. If revenues decline or costs increase,
leaving a shortfall in available resources, he should make recom115. S. 1541, § 703(a) (1).
116. The pilot-testing provision was included in the Government Operations Committee draft of S. 1541, § 701, but was excluded from the Rules Committee draft. The floor
amendment, calling for further study, is reported at 120 CONG. REc. S 4017-22 (daily ed. Mar.
20, 1974).

19741

BUDGET REFORM

mendations to Congress for further legislative action to meet the
changed circumstances.
The following recommendations for reform of the system for
executing appropriations follow this approach.
RECOMMENDATION 9.

DEFINITIONS

(a) "Impoundment" should be defined as follows: "Any
action or inaction of any executive or administrative agency or
officer, tending to eliminate, reduce, or delay the obligation,
commitment, allotment, apportionment, or expenditure of
budget authority, except if such action or inaction is a 'variance' as defined below."
(b) "Variance" should be defined as follows: "Any action
or inaction or any executive or administrative agency or officer,
tending to eliminate, reduce or delay the obligation, commitment, allotment, apportionment or expenditure of budget authority, if the purpose and result are not inconsistent with the
intent of Congress expressed or clearly implied in the appropriation act creating the budget authority."
(c) Other terms used in the execution of appropriations
such as "allotment," "apportionment," etc. should be defined
by statute, so that their meanings can be clarified and
preserved.
Commentary
The Federal Impoundment and Information Act'17 requires the
OMB to render quarterly reports of "impoundments," but neither
this Act nor any other defines the term. In rendering its quarterly
reports, OMB has reported its "reserves" and has indicated that
these "reserves" are the "impoundments" which OMB intends to
report." 8 The Anti-Deficiency Act"' authorizes the creation of "reserves" in order to provide for contingencies, or to effect savings
whenever they are made possible by changes in requirements,
greater operational efficiency, or other developments subsequent to
the date when the funds were made available. OMB has interpreted
the Anti-Deficiency Act as authorizing reserves "for the purpose of
conforming to the requirements of other laws. An example is the
Executive's responsibility to stay within the statutory limitation on
117.
118.
119.

31 U.S.C. § 581c-1 (Supp. II, 1972).
OMB Report Feb. 4, 1974, supra note 32, at 7708-09 (1974).
31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970).
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By creating a reserve on the basis

of the debt ceiling, a general statute that does not mention any
particular governmental program, OMB clearly frustrates congressional intent with regard to the program whose funds were "reserved." In determining which programs to cut in order to scale total
spending down to debt ceiling limits, OMB cuts those programs
which have the lowest executive priority, without regard to congres2

sional priorities.1 '

Recent cases have rejected the OMB's broad interpretation of
the Anti-Deficiency Act. 22 The bill pending in the Senate would

amend the Anti-Deficiency Act by deleting the clause authorizing
creation of reserves in response to "other developments" and adding
the following clarifying language: "Reserves shall not be established
for fiscal policy purposes or to achieve less than the full objectives
and scope of programs enacted and funded by Congress. .

.

.Ex-

cept as specifically provided by particular appropriations Acts or
other laws, no reserves shall be established other than as authorized
by this paragraph."' Thus, under the Senate bill, a legitimate
reserve is one which fulfills the intent of Congress with regard to the
specific program affected, and an illegitimate reserve is one which
frustrates that intent.
The weakness of the Senate bill is that it deals solely with the
creation of reserves, which is only one method by which the executive can impede the flow of funds to a program. The executive
branch could easily comply with the letter of the bill by refraining
from creating unauthorized reserves, while at the same time violating its spirit by impeding the flow of funds through other techniques
such as delaying allotment or slowing down the processing of applications.

2 41

In an attempt to close the loopholes, Senators Ervin and Magnuson engaged in a dialogue during the floor debate, closing with
the following exchange:'2
"Mr. Magnuson. Is it correct to say that under title X, the
executive branch may not take any action to delay or withhold
appropriations or budget authority, whatever the method or
semantic description of the method?"
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

OMB Report Feb. 4, 1974, supra note 32, at 7708.
PreliminaryFindings, supra note 15, at S 21120, 21122.
See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
S. 1541, § 1001.
PreliminaryFindings, supra note 15, at S 21120, 21122-23.
CONG. REc. S 4295 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1974).
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"Mr. Ervin. That is correct."
These two Senators evidently intended to use the term "reserve" in
this bill in a different sense than it has been used in the AntiDeficiency Act' 6 and in budgetary practice'" in the past. Whether
their dialogue accomplishes this task is a matter of opinion.
The proposed House bill defines "impoundment" much more
broadly as encompassing "any other type of Executive action or
inaction which effectively precludes the obligation or expenditure of
authorized budget authority or the creation of obligations by contract in advance of appropriations as specifically authorized by
law."' 8 However, the House bill fails to differentiate between impoundments that fulfill and those that frustrate congressional intent with regard to the specific program affected.
The recommended definitions make this distinction, as does
the Senate bill, and they also include the "any action or inaction"
language of the House bill. The term "variance" is suggested for
funding cuts or delays which conform to congressional intent with
regard to the affected program, while the term "impoundment" is
confined to funding cuts or delays which do not qualify as variances.
Other terms used in the execution of appropriations should also be
statutorily defined, so as to clarify and preserve existing meanings.
RECOMMENDATION 10. PROCEDURE FOR IMPOUNDING
(a) The President should not exercise any impoundment
unless and to the extent that Congress has given prior approval.
(b) The President may at any time request prior congressional approval of a proposed impoundment, and upon receiving
such a request Congress should proceed as follows:
(i) The budget committees, the congressional budget
office and other concerned committees should report to
Congress;
(ii) Congress may approve all or any part or aspect of
the proposed impoundment by concurrent resolution, provided
that the impoundment will have no significant effect on the
amount of budget authority or outlays appropriatedfor any fiscal year;
126.
127.
supra.
128.

31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970).
Current practice is reflected, for example, in OMB Report, Feb. 4, 1974, note 32
H.R. 7130, § 203.
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(iii) If the impoundment will have a significant effect
on the amount of budget authority or outlays appropriated for
the affected program for any fiscal year, Congress should regard
the President's request for impoundment as if it were a request
for rescission, and Congress may take rescission action.
Commentary
(a) If proper procedures have been followed in enacting appropriations under a strengthened system, the President should not
have discretion to carry out an impoundment, as defined above. He
should be required to seek advance congressional approval for any
impoundment, with Congress acting by concurrent resolution to
give or deny its approval. If the proposed impoundment will have a
significant effect on the amount of funds appropriated for the affected program for any fiscal year, Congress should follow the more
formal procedure of rescission.
(b) The existing state of the law regarding impoundment, as
defined herein, is a matter of continuing dispute. OMB interprets
the Anti-Deficiency Act as authorizing certain types of impoundment,2 9 while the executive branch has asserted additional justifications arising from statutes and from the Constitution itself.2 "
The House Bill provides that whenever the President impounds, he shall promptly report to Congress and shall cease the
impoundment if either house passes a resolution of disapproval
within sixty days after learning of the impoundment from either the
President or the Comptroller General.' 3 ' The latter official is authorized to bring suit to enforce these provisions.'32
The Senate bill would prohibit the creation of the type of "reserve" that would fall within our definition of impoundment.'3 3 The
bill makes no mention of any other types of action or inaction which
would fall within this definition, although two Senators created
legislative history intended to define "reserve" to include "any action."'34
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
See note 27 supra.
Id. §§ 201-02.
Id. § 206.
S. 1541, § 1001.
See text accompanying notes 125-27 supra.
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RECOMMENDATION 11. PROCEDURE FOR EXERCISING
VARIANCE
[NOTE: Two alternativesare submitted]
ALTERNATIVE

A.

(a) The President may exercise a variance without prior
congressional approval, subject to the following provisions.
(b) The President should report periodically to Congress,
the Comptroller General and the congressional budget office,
concerning all variances he has exercised.
(c) When information about the exercise of a variance has
been received, from either the President or any other source:
(i) The Comptroller General and the congressional
budget office should report to the budget committees if any variance appears improper;
(ii) The budget committees should report to Congress,
and should include in their reports any comments received from
the Comptroller General or the congressional budget office regarding the impropriety of any variance;
(iii) Congress may, by concurrent resolution, disapprove all or any part or aspect of any variance and may express
congressional intent regarding execution of the appropriation;
the President should then conform to the concurrent resolution;
(iv) Congress may regard the variance as a presidential request for rescission, and Congress may take rescission
action.
ALTERNATIVE

B.

(a) Except in emergencies (to be defined by general guidelines), the President should not exercise a variance without first
requesting the Comptroller General to certify as provided in this
section.
(b) The President may at any time request the Comptroller
General to certify a proposed variance, but, to the extent feasible, requests for variance should be submitted in consolidated
messages on a regular basis in advance of each calendar
quarter.
(c) The Comptroller General should promptly certify to the
President and Congress his opinion as to whether the proposed
actions qualify as variances.
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(d) The Comptroller General's certification should have
the following effects, and the President should act accordingly:
(i) If the Comptroller General certifies that the proposed action is a variance, it should be deemed to have received
congressional approval and may be implemented. Subsequently,
Congress may initiate action resulting in a concurrent resolution of disapproval.
(ii) If the Comptroller General certifies that the proposed action is not a variance, the matter should be promptly
referred to the budget committees and reported by them to Congress. Congress should then proceed as if the President had
requested prior approval for a proposed impoundment, and the
proposed variance should not be deemed to have been approved
unless Congress approves it in the same manner as an
impoundment.
Commentary

The two authors of this article disagree on some aspects of the
variance, and therefore two alternative recommendations are offered.
We both agree on certain points. Congress should have final
authority to approve or disapprove variances, and congressional action should be facilitated by requiring the Comptroller General to
screen variances and to report to Congress. Furthermore, in strictly
defined emergency situations the President should have limited authority to exercise a variance without prior notice to Congress, subject to the earliest possible congressional review. However, we disagree as to whether, in nonemergency situations, the President
should also be authorized to exercise a variance without giving Congress prior notice and an opportunity to disapprove.
The pending House bill, defining "impoundment" broadly so as
to include both our categories of "impoundment" and "variance,"' 3
provides that whenever the President "impounds," he shall
promptly report to Congress, and shall cease the impoundment if
either house passes a resolution disapproving his action within sixty
days after Congress learns of the impoundment
from either the Pres138
ident or the Comptroller General.

The pending Senate bill, defiing "reserve" so that it bears
some resemblance to our definition of "variance," requires the Pres135.
136.

H.R. 7130, § 203.
Id., §§ 201-02.

BUDGET REFORM

19741

ident to give ten days' notice to the Comptroller General prior to the
establishment of a reserve.' 3 The Comptroller General is authorized
to bring suit to enforce this provision, apparently by seeking an
injunction restraining the President from establishing a reserve of
which he has given advance notice, if the reserve is not within the
authority of this statute. The Senate bill gives Congress no role in
approving or disapproving a reserve. However, the bill requires the
President to ask Congress to rescind any available budget authority
that exceeds the amount required to fulfill the objectives and scope
38
of the program concerned.'
Alternative A 139 permits the President, even in non-emergency
situations, to exercise a variance without prior notice to Congress.
He is required to report all variances to Congress, through the
Comptroller General and the congressional budget office. Upon receiving reports from these officials, Congress may disapprove all or
any part or aspect of a variance or may regard the variance as a
request for rescission.
Alternative B'4" requires the President, except in emergencies,
to request the Comptroller General to certify his opinion as to
whether each proposed action qualifies as a variance; as a practical
matter, these certification requests should normally be made and
answered in consolidated messages on a regular basis before each
calendar quarter. If the Comptroller General certifies that the proposed action is a variance, Congress will be deemed to have approved it, and can halt the variance by subsequent action, as in
Alternative A. If, however, the Comptroller General determines that
the proposed action is not actually a variance, the situation should
be treated as a request for prior approval of a proposed impoundment. The purpose of Alternative B is to prevent the implementation of cutbacks which could cause irreparable harm to programs
before congressional disapproval. The screening by the Comptroller
General reduces the risk that an impoundment may be carried out
in the guise of a variance.
Both alternatives distinguish between the roles of the Comptroller General and Congress. The Comptroller General is required
to pass upon the propriety of a variance, either after it has been
exercised (Alternative A) or before its exercise (Alternative B). By
contrast, Congress can approve or disapprove, for any reason, including considerations of policy.
137.
138.

S. 1541, § 1001.
Id.

139.
140.

Alternative A is favored by Levinson.
Alternative B is favored by Mills.
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RECOMMENDATION 12. INITIATION OF PROPOSED IMPOUNDMENT OR VARIANCE BY BUDGET COMMITTEES
The budget committee of either house may initiate a proposal for impoundment or variance provided that the committee,
before reporting to Congress, submits a draft of the proposal to
the President and invites him to comment within a reasonable
time and that the committee includes in its report to Congress
any comments received from the President.
Commentary
In order to round out congressional control over execution of the
budget, the budget committees should be authorized to initiate
proposals for impoundment or variance. This initiative might be
useful, for example, if Congress agreed with the President that economic conditions necessitated the impoundment of a certain aggregate amount of funds but did not agree with the President's choice
of programs to be impounded. Congress could then disapprove the
President's request for impoundment, while initiating its own proposal for impoundment of different programs.
The above recommendation contemplates a dialogue between
the President and Congress, by requiring that the President be invited to make advisory comments prior to congressional action on
proposals initiated by the budget committees for impoundment or
variance.
RECOMMENDATION 13. REPORTING AND AUDITING
(a) The President should periodically report to Congress,
submitting adequately documented lists of all impoundments
and variances that have been exercised and indicating the status of congressional action on each.
(b) The Comptroller General should audit the records of
OMB, the Treasury Department, and other federal agencies
regarding the execution of appropriations and should render
periodic reports to Congress, directing special attention to any
previously undisclosed exercise of an impoundment or variance
and commenting on any meritorious complaint received from
any person alleging any impropriety in the execution of
appropriations.
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Commentary
(a) In addition to rendering reports at the time of an actual
or proposed impoundment or variance, the President should submit
periodic checklists to Congress, so that the Comptroller General can
ascertain that Congress was properly consulted in each instance.
(b) The Comptroller General should, moreover, conduct a
post-audit of the execution of appropriations with special emphasis
on previously undisclosed impoundments or variances and with special comment on citizen complaints alleging improprieties. Field
research has demonstrated the limited scope of the Comptroller
General's functions in these areas at present."'
An expanded audit could greatly increase the confidence of
Congress and the public in the regularity of procedures in the executive branch. Expansion of the Comptroller General's post-audit
would also improve the President's ability to supervise the functions
of executive agencies. Finally, such expansion of the post-audit
would provide Congress with a monitoring device to observe the
execution of appropriations.
As the courts continue to invalidate impoundments which have
been carried out openly by the creation of OMB reserves, the executive apparently has reacted by using less obvious means of reducing
or delaying spending.' The need for expanded post-audit is thus
underlined.
E.

Budget-relatedLitigation

The impoundment-related litigation of the past two years has
demonstrated the continuing ability of the courts to cope with novel
situations. To a great extent the following recommendations are
declaratory of existing practice developed by the courts. Special
comment is added regarding the minor changes proposed.
RECOMMENDATION 14.

ACCESS TO COURTS

(a) State and local government units adversely affected,
persons adversely affected, and a broad range of executive and
141. The accompanying text is based upon confidential interviews conducted by the
authors during the McIntosh Foundation Executive Impoundment Project, 1973.
142. Dr. Louis Fisher has demonstrated that many functional equivalents of impoundment have been omitted from the OMB quarterly reports. Fisher, Impoundment of Funds:
Uses and Abuses, 23 BUFFALO L. REv. 141, 191-200 (1973). The same author has suggested

that the Executive is likely to resort increasingly to the use of "quasi-impoundments," in
order to avoid the impact of recent court decisions that tend to prohibit overt impoundments.
L. FISHER, supra note 22, at 90.
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legislative personnel should have standing to bring budgetrelated suits.
(b) No suit related to appropriations or spending should be
justiciable until after enactment of the appropriation at issue.
(c) Courts should expedite decision of budget-related
cases.
(d) No budget-related suit should be barred, and no type
of relief in any such suit should be denied on the grounds of
sovereign immunity.
Commentary
(a) Without attempting a definitive catalog, we suggest that
standing to sue in budget-related cases be conferred upon state and
local governments adversely affected (and this seems especially
important in view of revenue-sharing distributions), persons adversely affected (such as potential beneficiaries of an impounded
program), and a broad range of executive and legislative personnel
(including the Comptroller General and the director of the congressional budget office).
Fears will always be expressed about the prospect of embroiling
the system in endless litigation. Such fears have generally proved
to be unfounded due to the ability of the courts to consolidate similar cases, dispose summarily of frivolous complaints and give expeditious relief when needed. The view of standing that has been
followed in the recent impoundment-related litigation demonstrates
that the courts are able, in this area as well as in others, to cope with
3
broad grants of standing.1
(b) Pre-enactment litigation challenging the propreity of various stages of the process presents a high risk of disrupting the entire
budget process and would always place the courts under the most
extreme pressure to render a speedy decision.
Although some improprieties in the pre-enactment process
might be cured by such litigation, on balance it seems preferable to
postpone justiciability until after enactment of the appropriation at
issue.
(c) Since other statutes provide that various other types of
litigation be expedited,' budget-related cases should be similarly
provided for, as a protection against being put aside in favor of other
143. On standing generally, see K. DAVIS, AdministrativeLaw Treatise, ch. 22 (1958).
144. The following types of cases are required to be "expedited," "advanced" or "preferred:" Federal campaign fund, 2 U.S.C. § 438(d) (5); environmental pesticide control, 7
U.S.C. § 136n(b); seeds, cease and desist order, 7 U.S.C. § 1601; Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
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types of litigation under expediting statutes.
(d) Sovereign immunity has posed some difficulties in recent
budget-related litigation and has occasionally been used as a basis
for denying relief.1 5 Once an appropriation bill has been enacted,
we see no sound reason for asserting sovereign immunity as a basis
for preventing full judicial consideration and relief.
RECOMMENDATION 15.
AVAILABLE

TYPES OF JUDICIAL RELIEF

Courts should grant any type of relief necessary in budgetrelated litigation including:
(a) Mandamus to compel performance of ministerial acts;
(b) Injunction to restrain violations of law;
(c) Declaration of invalidity of any action inadequately
supported by a required record or resulting from significant
violation of law;
(d) Order for release of funds improperly withheld;
(e) Stay of effectiveness of any action pending further
proceedings;
(f) Remand for further proceedings;
(g) Any other relief authorized by law or practice.
Commentary
Courts should have clear authority to grant whatever relief is
called for to render justice in budget-related cases. This recommendation restates well-recognized remedies and adds that the courts
can declare the invalidity of any action inadequately supported by
a required record. This type of relief is intended to enforce the
portions of the recommendations requiring documentary records to
be compiled and maintained."'
III.

Conclusion

A year ago both houses of Congress passed different versions of
§ 21(e); Expediting Act for three-judge court cases under Sherman Act and Interstate Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 28, 49 U.S.C. § 44; FTC unfair competition, 15 U.S.C. § 45(e); small
business investment companies, 15 U.S.C. § 687a(f); small business administration, 15
U.S.C. § 687c(a); foreign propagandists registration, 22 U.S.C. § 618(0; state individual
income tax, federal collection, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 6363(d)(4); presidential election
campaign fund, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 9011(b); interlocutory injunction, certain agencies,
28 U.S.C. § 2349(b); inclosure of public lands, 43 U.S.C. § 1062:
145. Housing Authority v. HUD, 340 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Redevelopment
Agency v. Nixon, 329 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
146. See Recommendations 1-2 supra.
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impoundment control bills. The conference committee was unable
to resolve the differences. More recently each house recognized that
impoundment control should be dealt with as part of a larger package, reforming the budget process in general. Last year's impoundment control bills were revived, with modifications, and incorporated into the bills recently passed by both Houses. These bills,
although described as budget reform bills, do not cover every aspect
of that topic. As previously indicated, the bills largely neglect the
revenue and debt functions, except to coordinate their totals with
the total amount of expenditures. The bills emphasize procedural
reform of the spending function, including control of the President's
discretion to impound. Neither of the bills extends to the range of
reforms covered in our recommendations. Further study and experimentation are called for by the Senate bill.
The pending bills attempt to serve conflicting goals. While recognizing the need for comprehensive reform of the budget process,
they nevertheless follow paths of prudence in keeping as close as
possible to existing practices and in retaining the influential positions of as many existing personalities as possible.147 The compromise between these two goals, reflected in the pending bills, may
well expedite the enactment of a budget reform act into law, but at
the cost of making that act a relatively ineffective instrument. Some
of the weaknesses have been pointed out in the preceding discussion-the pending bills make virtually no provisions for publicity of
the process, their beginning-of-season target figures are not binding,
appropriations continue to be enacted piecemeal, and supplemental
appropriations and continuing resolutions remain unchanged.
Enactment of a relatively weak measure now may pave the way
for broader reforms later, or may produce an unsatisfactory interim
system, as did the reforms of the late 1940's, leading to abandonment of reform efforts rather than to their escalation. While the
reformist mood prevails, it would be preferable to see Congress attempt the most comprehensive reforms rather than the most
friction-free.
One risk of comprehensive reform is that future Congresses may
reject the discipline imposed by their predecessors. This risk can be
minimized if the reformed system works effectively through the efforts of professional staff in Congress and the executive branch, and
if citizens continue to expect Congress to operate under such a system.
147. A similar point is made in Schick, Budget Reform Legislation: Reorganizing Congressional Centers of Fiscal Power, 11 HARV. J. LEGIS. 303, 304 (1974).
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These recommendations are submitted, therefore, not as an
agenda for long-term gradual implementation but as a package proposed for prompt and complete implementation. The recommendations have been drafted in the form of standards that, if approved
in principle, would require implementation in somewhat different
format and in some instances in greater detail.
Most of the recommendations require implementation in the
form of statutes or rules of the houses of Congress. Some, however,
may be appropriately accomplished by executive action. For example, the recommendation calling for publicity of executive documents could be implemented by executive order, thereby avoiding
the possibility of confrontation that might arise if Congress legislated in a field the President might regard as privileged. Other
recommendations, such as those dealing with OMB hearings, could
be implemented by OMB regulations.
A number of recommendations call for a blending of executive
and legislative functions during the budget process. A promising
start would be made if the President and Congress could cooperate
in bringing about budget reform by means of a combination of executive and legislative actions.*
*

See Appendix at 664 infra for subsequent Congressional action concerning pending

budget reform legislation.
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APPENDIX
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL
ACT OF 1974
Congress completed action on the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 during the month of June 1974. The conference committee bill
was approved by a 401 to 6 vote of the House, and by a 75 to 0 vote of the Senate.
Essential legislative history is provided by the conference committee report, H.R.
REP. No. 93-1101, inserted in 120 CONG. REc. H 4979 (daily ed. June 11, 1974), and
by the floor debates in the House, 120 CONG. REc. H 5180 (daily ed. June 18, 1974)
and in the Senate, 120 CONG. REc. S 11221 (daily ed. June 21, 1974).
President Nixon had taken no action on the bill as of this writing.
The budget reform provisions of the Act closely follow the organization and
substance of the Senate bill. The impoundment control provisions reflect a considerable rewrite by the conference committee, combining some provisions of the
Senate bill with some of the House bill and still some others newly added by the
conference committee. The effective dates closely follow the Senate bill, making
the impoundment control provisions effective immediately, while phasing in the
budget reform provisions, most of which do not become effective until 1976.
This appendix briefly notes some of the major achievements and omissions of
the Act, under the same headings used in the article.
A. Regularized and Public Procedure-(see our Recommendations 1-3 and text
accompanying notes 59-66 supra.)
The Act does not deal with the procedure within the executive branch during
the preparation and execution of the budget, nor with the publicity of these functions. The President could thus render a distinct service by issuing executive orders
and regulations dealing with these matters.
As regards publicity of congressional action, § 101(d) of the Act provides public access to meetings of the Senate budget committee and its subcommittees,
subject to some exceptions. No such piovision applies to meetings of the House
budget committee or its subcommittees. Section 203 provides public access to the
files of the Congressional Budget Office, subject to a number of exceptions.
B. Budget Preparation- (see our Recommendation 4 and text accompanying
notes 67-72 supra.)
Sections 601-604 significantly increase the amount of information required in
the President's budget message, including presentation in terms of national needs,
agency missions and basic programs.
C.

Enactment of Appropriations
1. Timetable-(see our Recommendation 5 and text accompanying notes 7375 supra.)
Sections 501-502 change the fiscal year to Oct. 1, following a three month
transition period from July 1 to Sept. 30, 1976. As a means of enforcing congressional compliance with the timetable for action on the budget, § 301(f) prohibits
Congress from adjourning until action has been completed on the annual budget.
More stringent timetable enforcement mechanisms may be needed.
2. Congressional Organizationand Staff-(see our Recommendation 6 and
text accompanying notes 76-82 supra.)
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Section 101 creates the 23-member Committee on the Budget of the House,
and § 102 creates the 15-member Committee on the Budget of the Senate. Composition of the committees reflects a compromise between seniority and diversity.
Sections 201-202 create the Congressional Budget Office and specify its duties
and functions. The director is appointed by the Speaker of the House and the
President pro tem of the Senate. His term expires on January 3, 1979 and each
fourth year thereafter. His powers are broad, including the power to secure information directly from the executive branch.
3. Procedurefor Enacting Appropriations-(seeour Recommendation 7 and
text accompanying notes 83-109 supra.)
Section 401 requires, with some exceptions, that legislation creating contract,
borrowing and entitlement authority must contain a provision that such authority
is to be effective only to the extent provided in appropriation acts. This section
closes the back door, but only for the future, since it does not apply to authority
in effect prior to the effective date of this section of the Act.
Congressional action on the budget is focused in two concurrent resolutions,
setting forth total outlays, budget authority, revenues, surplus or deficit, debt and
other appropriate matters. Section 301(b)(1) permits the first concurrent resolution
to establish the approximate equivalent of an omnibus appropriation procedure for
the year, but no attempt is made to give the President the equivalent of an item
veto. Congressional action on the budget is completed by a reconciliation process
that brings authorizations, appropriations, revenue and debt into conformity with
the second concurrent resolution.
The Act does not deal with continuing resolutions or supplemental appropriations, which apparently retain their existing attributes, subject to conformity with
the concurrent resolutions. This requirement presents no serious obstacle, since
§ 304 permits amendment of the concurrent resolution at any time during the
fiscal year.
4. Format of Appropriation Bills-(see our Recommendation 8 and text accompanying notes 110-16 supra.)
Although the Act requires the concurrent resolutions to include outlays as well
as budget authority, this treatment is not carried through to the appropriation acts,
which continue to deal only with budget authority.
D. Execution of Appropriations-(see our Recommendations 9-13 and text accompanying notes 117-42 supra.)
Section 1002 amends the Anti-Deficiency Act by deleting the "other developments" clause, thereby closing a major loophole upon which the President has
relied. Section 1003 repeals the Impoundment and Information Act, since other
provisions of the present Act impose their own reporting requirements, including
the publication of monthly reports in the Federal Register.
Sections 1011-1017 provide the system of impoundment control. If the President determines that part of available budget authority will not be needed, he shall
ask Congress for a rescission.
A different procedure applies to "deferrals," defined in the Act as including,
"(A) withholding or delaying the obligation or expenditure of budget authority
(whether by establishing reserves or otherwise) provided for projects or activities;
or (B) any other type of Executive action or inaction which effectively precludes
the obligation or expenditure of budget authority, including authority to obligate
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by contract in advance of appropriations as specifically authorized by law." The
President shall transmit a special message to Congress on each proposed deferral.
Either House may pass an "impoundment resolution" disapproving such deferral
at any time, and the President is thereupon required to make the budget authority
available for obligation.
A dialogue between Senators Ervin and Humphrey during the floor debate
suggested that the President report in greater detail on "policy impoundments"
than on "routine impoundments," so that Congress does not have to "plow through
hundreds and hundreds of routine impoundments in order to locate a few significant items." 120 CONG. REc. S 11238-9 (daily ed. June 21, 1974). In practice, the
plowing is likely to be the primary task of the Comptroller General, who is required
to advise Congress regarding the legality and other aspects of each proposed deferral. Further, if the Comptroller General finds that any action or inaction that
constitutes a reserve or deferral has not been reported to Congress, he shall himself
make the report, which will enable Congress to follow through.
The Act implicitly relies upon the proposition, reflected in recent decisions of
lower federal courts, that Congress has constitutional power to require the President to spend appropriated funds. Assuming Congress has this power, a further
constitutional question is raised by the delegation of power in the statute which,
without spelling out any standards, permits either House to override any deferral,
even if the deferral is authorized by the Anti-Deficiency Act. This provision is
subject to criticism on other grounds also: it permits either House to override a
deferral, even though the other House may take the contrary view; it does not
permit Congress to initiate a deferral; and it becomes effective two years before the
budget reform provisions, thereby giving either House massive authority over the
execution of appropriations before Congress has developed a coordinated approach
to the enactment of appropriations. Unless both Houses exercise this override
power with restraint, serious difficulties can be anticipated.
E. Budget-related Litigation-(seeour Recommendations 14-15 and text accompanying notes 143-46 supra.)
Section 1016 authorizes the Comptroller General to bring enforcement suits,
through attorneys of his own choosing, but only as a means of compelling the
executive to comply with congressional action (or inaction on rescission or impoundment matters).
The availability of congressional rescission and impoundment measures, enforceable by the Comptroller General, arguably pre-empts other types of
impoundment-related litigation, on the theory that the new Act gives Congress
ample opportunity to express and enforce its intent at any time, and that any
deferral surviving these opportunities must therefore be deemed to have received
congressional approval. Thus, the Act may shift impoundment control from the
courts to Congress, with the courts retaining the limited role of enforcing direct
expressions of congressional intent. If the Act, as interpreted, produces this effect,
frustrated beneficiaries of impounded programs will be constrained to seek relief
in the legislative rather than the judicial forum.

